What does it mean to be ethical in psychotherapy? Does adherence to ethical codes and rules make a psychotherapist ethical? This article examines standard ways of thinking about ethics in the field and argues that these ways are inadequate, creating a false dichotomy between the ethical and the clinical, and that they are designed only for formal and contractual relationships, in which psychotherapy is more often personal and affecting. The ethic of care and the approach to ethics of Emmanuel Levinas are presented as additional approaches, along with their challenges to rationality and autonomy. An ethic of listening is then presented, and it is argued that ethics should be not an afterthought, but the primary consideration of clinical utility.
I begin with this quote from Arthur Kleinman because I am sure that I am not alone in my suspicion that ethics is a matter of supreme importance, in life and in psychotherapy. And I am also sure that I am not alone in being daunted by what ethics actually means, apart from ethical codes and legal management. But in this avoidance of what it means to be with another human being, what it means to be a healing presence, what it means to be truly ethical, we run the risk of conflating ethics with risk management, mistaking rules for relationships, and damaging those very people whom we so desperately want to help.
In this article, I argue that standard notions of ethics are not adequate in a quest to be truly ethical. These standard ways of thinking about ethics stand too far from the ethical moment and create a false clarity, much as a newspaper photograph creates images from a display of dots. This distance created between therapeutic moments and the application of "ethics" also creates a false distinction between what is considered "clinical" and what is considered "ethical." In the first section, I review some of the current thinking in ethics in the field of psychotherapy and summarize the philosophical basis of our current ethical codes and understandings. In the second section, I critique those approaches and examine the ethic of care, which brings us closer to the human encounter and how it might be applied to psychotherapy. The third section comes closer still to the heart of ethics-the face-to-face encounter with the other-where the ethical and the therapeutic merge, where our epistemologies are questioned, and where what it means to be a "self" is challenged. I close with a consideration of the ethics of listening (as opposed to the clinical utility of listening) and ethics as a primary approach in psychotherapy rather than an afterthought to be considered separately.
THE VIEW FROM A DISTANCE: THE ETHIC OF REASON, AUTONOMY, AND THE GENERALIZED OTHER
" … [P]rinciple ethics," defined for our purposes as acting according to the moral principles listed above, allows the possibility that ethical behavior can occur solely as the result of professional obligation and deliberate adherence to rules rather than moral commitment according to one's conscience and personally held standards. (Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998, p. 5) In this section, I examine current thinking in ethics in psychotherapy. This includes a brief assessment of three of the current books on ethics (Bersoff, 2003; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998; Pope & Vasquez, 1998) and an analysis of some ethics workshops, including those at the 2004 American Psychological Association (APA) convention. Following is an examination of the kind of reasoning that underlies our usual approaches to ethics:
Case 4-15: Robert Bumble, Ph.D., began treating a troubled young woman in an office at his home. Dr. Bumble failed to recognize increasing signs of paranoid decompensation in his client until she began to act out destructively in his office. At that point, he attempted to refer her elsewhere, but she reacted with increased paranoia and rage. Dr. Bumble terminated the relationship, or so he thought. The ex-client took an apartment across the street from his home to spy on him, telephoned him at all hours of the day and night with an assortment of complaints and explicit threats, and filed ethical complaints against him. (Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998, p. 89) This is a typical case study presented as a training model to teach ethics in psychotherapy. In these vignettes, as in much of the writing about ethics, ethical problems are most often presented as separate from clinical work. For example, there are chapters about informed choices and contracts (Hare-Mustin, Maracek, Kaplan, & Liss-Levinson, 2003) , dealing with suicidality (Baerger, 2003) , and dealing with "difficult clients" (Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998) . Although some recent books on ethics present the importance of the therapist-client relationship (Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998) , there is very little emphasis in the psychological literature on the ethics of relationship and how ethical rules play themselves out (or fail to) in living relationships.
An additional example of this disparity between ethics and clinical work can be found in an analysis of the Continuing Education workshops at the 2004 APA convention. This analysis reveals that, although one treatment workshop on religion and spirituality mentioned including a discussion of ethics (although ethics was not included in the workshop goals), none of the rest did. One of the ethics workshops mentioned the overlap between clinical and ethical issues, but it still treated ethical and legal issues as primary (APA, 2004) .
A recent ethics workshop sponsored by the Oregon Psychological Association was presented by a lawyer, not a psychologist, and included the following description:
The ethics workshop, Ethical Standards, Ethical Codes, and Ethical Behavior: What's a Psychologist to Do?, will include both an information session and group discussion of ethical situations and problems. The goals of the workshop are to provide participants with a better understanding of the APA Ethics Code, an understanding of the difference between the APA Ethics Code and the ASPPB [Association of State and Provincial Psychology Boards] Code of Conduct, and an understanding of how to analyze ethical dilemmas under each Code. (Quigley, 2002, p. 1) Clinical issues are never mentioned.
One outcome of this division between ethics and clinical work is to see ethics as simply a system of rules that one must learn to become a responsible member of the profession. Along this line, Bersoff (2003) said the following:
Learning about ethics and the particular code of conduct promulgated by one's professional organization is, thus, one of the major and essential components of a student's socialization into the profession … The code of ethics … should … instruct those who study it how to relate to their colleagues and how to fulfill their professional roles and responsibilities toward those they serve-clients, patients … and the public at large. (p. 1) In summary, ethics in our profession has largely come to mean a system giving us rules on how to relate to our colleagues and clients, not a matter of how we are or are not present with the human being facing us. This system is also supposed to protect us from potential lawsuits and litigation, although its potential usefulness in this is unclear (O'Donohue & Mangold, 1996) . Where does this division come from? Does following an ethical code make us truly ethical clinicians and people? Or does it separate us from ourselves and the people we work with, relegating ethics to following a set of rules that otherwise does not apply to our everyday life and work (see also Brown, 2003) ? O'Donohue and Mangold (1996) examined the philosophical underpinnings of the current APA code of ethics (APA, 2002) . Their analysis suggests that two influential theories may be the basis of the ethical code: utilitarianism and deontological ethics. I would add here the contract ethics of John Rawls (1971) , or what Talbot (2000) called in sum "liberal moral theory." These are the primary Western approaches to ethics, which assume that what is ethical can be deduced from reason and from analyzing situations in which we find ourselves. It is the theory behind the now famous research of Kohlberg (1984) , in which the Heinz Dilemma 1 is representative of a situation from which we can deduce these universal principles and where the highest level of moral development is that of responding to universal (and rational) principles. Ethical codes reflect this reasoning, although they are not determined by it (O'Donohue & Mangold, 1996) .
Liberal moral theory relies on autonomy, reason, and universality (Mensch, 2003; Talbot, 2000) to determine what is ethical. For example, Kant's deontological ethics is based on two givens: universalization and autonomy. To illustrate, Kant's formula for the categorical imperative is as follows:
Since I have robbed the will of every inducement that might arise for it as a consequence of obeying any particular law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions to universal law [italics added] as such, and this alone must serve the will as its principle. That is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also 98 BIRRELL 1 The Heinz Dilemma is a famous dilemma introduced by Kohlberg (1963) :
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done that ? (p. 19) will that my maxim should become a universal law [italics added]. (Kant, quoted in Mensch, 2003, p. 6) Mensch pointed out that to universalize a maxim is to abstract the person following it from any particular situation. And Kant goes on to say, "the principle of autonomy is the sole principle of ethics" (Kant, quoted in Mensch, 2003, p. 6) . So, according to Kant, to be ethical, we must abstract ourselves from the world and act autonomously.
Liberal moral ethics also is based on the privileging of reason over emotion. Talbot (2000) put it this way:
If … morality is conceived in terms of impartial reason, and the private sphere is constituted in terms of emotion, then human experience is neatly bifurcated into what is rational, which equates with what lies within the moral sphere, and what is emotional, which lies outside morality. (p. 16) This can lead to the loss of emotional information as a means to ethical and moral decisions, as is discussed later.
Liberal moral theory therefore is considered to be pertinent only for "formal relationships," where the particularities of the other are irrelevant. In other words, "those with whom we engage in moral activity are not encountered ethically as specific, particular people but as promisers and promisees, contractors and contractees, or the objects of some other obligation on our part" (Talbot, 2000, p. 21) . What this means is that if we follow liberal moral theory as the basis of our ethical thinking, then the clients or patients with whom we meet are interchangeable entities, and our ethical treatment of them is determined by a set of rationally determined rules.
Another way of speaking of this aspect of liberal moral theory is that of the generalized other (Benhabib, 1987a (Benhabib, , 1987b . In standard discussions of ethics, people are not presented as discrete and concrete others, but as members of a class, be it a member of a race; social class; or, in our field, the more ubiquitous class of "patient" or "client." Generalized others as the partners in the moral dialogue or the persons affected by ethical decision making are assumed to be fundamentally the same: Each individual is seen as "a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves" (Benhabib, 1987a, p. 87) . This leads us to the language of right, obligation, and entitlement, and the moral ideas of respect, duty, worthiness, and dignity. There is no need to take into account "the individuality and concrete identity of the other," for "our relation to the other is governed by the norms of formal equality and reciprocity: each is entitled to expect and to assume from us what we can expect and assume from him or her" (Benhabib, 1987a, p. 87) . This can easily be seen in the vignette at the beginning of this section. There, "Dr. Bumble" and the "troubled young woman" are members of the classes therapist and client, respectively. They can be seen as interchangeable members of each class of people, each with rights, duties, and roles, but their particular individuality is not addressed or considered important. For example, what does Dr. Bumble in particular need from his work? How does the troubled young woman approach her life, and what are her particular circumstances? We would all agree that these details are important in clinical judgment, but they are completely overlooked in current thinking on ethics in the field.
There is nothing wrong with this language of rights and respect, of course. But, as I argue in the next sections of this article, it is incomplete, leaving us with not only an impoverished sense of the other, but an impoverished sense of ourselves.
Do we need ethical codes as guidelines for professional institutions? Absolutely. Do these ethical codes really help us in the day-to-day work of psychotherapy? I would argue that they do not. And I am not alone in this opinion. Pope and Vasquez (1998) 
stated the following:
Ethics codes cannot do our questioning, thinking, feeling, and responding for us. Such codes can never be a substitute for the active process by which the individual therapist or counselor struggles with the sometimes bewildering, always unique constellation of questions, responsibilities, contexts, and competing demands of helping another person … Ethics must be practical. Clinicians confront an almost unimaginable diversity of situations, each with its own shifting questions, demands, and responsibilities. Every clinician is unique in important ways. Every client is unique in important ways. Ethics that are out of touch with the practical realities of clinical work, with the diversity and constantly changing nature of the therapeutic venture, are useless. (p. 57) This is good advice indeed. But how are we to do this? Given that the language of ethics is general-that is, do no harm, work only within your competence, and so forth (APA, 2002)-how do we translate these general rules into the uniqueness of each clinical encounter? Most would argue that we use clinical judgment to do so, and of course we do. This article represents a further attempt to examine this very uniqueness and to take ethics to the level of the individual encounter and the individual moment.
A CLOSER VIEW: THE ETHIC OF DIALOGUE, CARE, AND IMMEDIACY
Apprehending the other's reality, feeling what he (sic) feels as nearly as possible, is the essential part of caring from the view of the one-caring. For if I take on the other's reality as possibility and begin to feel its reality, I feel, also, that I must act accordingly; that is, I am impelled to act as though in my own behalf, but in behalf of the other. (Noddings, 1984, p. 16) The essence of ethics is a never-ending pursuit of the good-in conduct, in personal relationships, in how we treat those around us. It is unethical to blindly follow ethical codes without scrutiny of their content, their values, and their assumptions. Ethics codes are, after all, socially shared patterns of moral judgments and behavior. How do we discern when these codes are themselves immoral? Unless we continually question them, they can become "finely textured masks for perpetuating power, alienation and control" (Welch, 2000, p. 15) . Bersoff (1994) pointed out that the ethical code of 1992 (APA, 1992) was an oxymoron, beset with lawyerly language; based on assumptions about passive patients, especially women; and setting an ethical floor but not urging us to "reach for the ceiling" (p. 385). Knapp and VandeCreek (2003) , in their comparison of the 1992 and 2002 codes, stated that "the 2002 Ethics Code is a conservative revision that retains the basic format, structure and most of the format of the 1992 Ethics Code" (p. 301), and that some changes (Standard 3.10d) are more for risk management rather than for the benefit of clients. Mensch (2003) argued that if ethics is merely following rules (and it most surely is), and society (or the profession) sets the rules, that ethics cannot express a standpoint that can call society (or the profession) into question. In this section, I problematize the underlying values of current ethical codes, particularly the autonomous self, universality, and reason (discussed previously). Ethical language, as stated previously, is general and universal. In other words, we are often not encouraged, as clinicians, to consider the particular aspects of an ethical situation, but instead to consult the ethical code or some other set of principles (Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998) . What matters in an "ethical dilemma" are the rules and which ethical principle applies, not the specifics of the particular situation in which we find ourselves-our own history, the particulars of the client with whom we are dealing, or the power dynamics implicit in the clinical situation (Brown, 2000) .
Let us take another look at the vignette of Dr. Bumble and the troubled young woman. From a distance, the ethical dilemma is clear. Dr. Bumble "failed to realize that his client was beyond his ability to treat until matters had seriously deteriorated" (Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998, p. 89 ). An ethics committee found him practicing beyond his level of competence, and there the matter rests. It is easy to see that this vignette and analysis fit well within the scope of liberal moral theory. Both people in the vignette are generalized others; the relationship is formal, meaning that reason is privileged over emotion; autonomy of the actors is assumed, and the relationship between them is ignored; and the analysis is universal in the sense that it applies to all clinicians and difficult clients.
But what if we take a closer look?
Robert Bumble, Ph.D., was treating a troubled young woman named Angela in his office at his home. The relationship between Dr. Bumble and Angela had been uneasy. Dr. Bumble felt that Angela was "putting him through his paces," as he told his colleagues. He had diagnosed her with Borderline Personality Disorder. During one particular session, Angela started asking questions about his personal life that Dr. Bumble found intrusive. He was somewhat uncomfortable and angry, and it had been a long day in a busy practice. He was tired of dealing with Angela. He fell back on his ethics training about boundary violation and deflected her questions. He then attempted to educate her on the topic of boundaries in psychotherapy.
Angela was indeed "troubled." She had a history of difficult relationships, never feeling a sense of acceptance and love from others. She felt some hope with Robert Bumble. He had treated her kindly and seemed attentive to her. As her hopes rose, she also felt a sense of rising desperation. What if things weren't as they seemed? What if this relationship turned out like all the others, with rejection, leaving her more hopeless than before? She tested Robert Bumble. She wanted to know. On the day he gave her the lecture on boundaries, she felt humiliated, lost, and angry. However, she could not allow herself to feel the hopelessness-the emotion threatened to swallow her up. Instead, she comforted herself with the thought that he really did love her, and if she only were able to stay close to him, things would work out. (my own extension of Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998, p. 89) When the relationship is no longer formal, when the people become more than interchangeable clinicians and clients, where do we go for ethical guidance? Here, we can begin to see that the ethical and the clinical do indeed overlap. Of course, Dr. Bumble could have responded in a very caring and compassionate way, and things could still have gone wrong with Angela. Just because things go wrong in interpersonal relations does not mean that something unethical has happened. Here, I am merely trying to give a closer and plausible view.
How could things have been different? Out of what other framework could Robert Bumble have acted? One major alternative to the decontextualized and universal approach to ethics has been that of care ethics, as put forth by Noddings and Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984) . Here, the central preoccupation is a responsiveness to others that dictates providing care, preventing harm, and maintaining relationships. Moral problems are embedded in a contextual frame that eludes abstract, universal reasoning. Noddings argued that because we are so intimately intertwined with one another, reasoning based on rules and contracts built around the self-contained individual distorts the actual conditions of our lives.
Care ethics portrays the moral agent as a someone who is embedded in webs of relations with others, not autonomous and abstracted. These relations shape the person's self-conception-the person defines him-or herself in terms of the relationships in which he or she is engaged, not as an autonomous self. The care agent approaches others with a caring attitude. In other words, care is both an action and a disposition. We are people to whom things matter (Talbot, 2000) . This interest and concern is manifested through attentiveness to the other's particular needs and unique life circumstances and through the expression of compassion when faced with great need or vulnerability on the part of the other.
Care manifests itself not only in an attitude and behavior, but also through a distinctive form of moral thinking. Care thinking is generally described as narrative, contextual, and particularistic, as opposed to abstract, autonomous, and universalistic. It contends that the right thing to do in these particular circumstances given this particular constellation of individuals and relationships need not be the right thing to do in all apparently similar cases. Care ethics embraces partiality as a moral good, maintaining that our responsibilities are (and should be) stronger toward those to whom we feel ourselves to be "closer," with our strongest responsibilities obtaining toward those who are both closer and more vulnerable (Talbot, 2000) . In other words, it is the one with whom we are interacting when the ethical moment occurs, not the faceless other.
Care ethics provides one alternative to the abstract and universal approach of liberal moral theory. It has been accused of being irrational and situational, and this is true if the "given" of ethics is the autonomous rational self. As Talbot (2000) pointed out, "where the self is regarded as separate and autonomous, impartial reason is supposed to establish both the means for the separate self to connect morally with others and the end served by this connection" (p. 79). But when connection is the starting point, both reason and ethics are seen as projects of selves-in-relation. And, for these selves-in-relation, connection is not an abstract mechanism but the concrete context that enables understanding of relational reality. There is no need for selves-in-relation to have this ethical "glue" to hold together what would otherwise be separate. "From the perspective of selves-in-relation, the separate self, like the generalized other, appears to be a philosophical abstraction: an idealized fantasy rather than a reflection of lived experience" (p. 82).
In care ethics, the concept of the generalized other is incomprehensible. Talbot (2000) stated that the discourse of the generalized other is fundamentally flawed. She used the arguments of Friedman and Benhabib (1987a) to argue that the language of the generalized other is incoherent in its abstraction, but also that even though it uses the language of the abstract, universal, and impartial, it is immersed in the concrete. For example, Friedman (1987) pointed out that if the Heinz dilemma can be resolved through impartial consideration of justice and rights, then the solution should not depend on the particulars of the situation. But the fallacy of this can be seen with the simple substitution of "Heidi" for Heinz, making "Hilda" the pharmacist, or asserting that the drug is for an acquaintance of Heinz rather than his wife.
The generalized other is also a stereotyped other. Mensch (2003) stated the following:
Insofar as I deny the other his [sic] uniqueness, I deny my need to respond uniquely-to respond as an individual to the individual who stands before me. In other words, I do not feel the need to transcend the social norms that set the stereotypes. Instead of encountering the person, I think the stereotype and close the door. Doing so, I deny the uniqueness of human life. (p. 118) Confronting one another in a truly ethical way, according to Mensch, should disrupt self-presence, a disruption that is impossible in the Cartesian and Kantian paradigm of objective observer. Other people stand merely as objects for the objective observer, for a generalized other is a totalized other, an other reduced to ourselves, because we can imagine it only by projecting our own subjectivity on it. In other words, being with someone (a concrete other rather than a generalized or stereotyped other) in a truly ethical way should change us.
To return to the vignette, Dr. Bumble does nothing unethical, in the traditional sense, in this interaction with his client, Angela. In fact, it might be argued that he is being ethical by maintaining boundaries and containing difficult behavior. This is entirely adequate if Angela is conceived of as a generalized other or difficult client. In this view, she has no face, no feelings, and no voice. Had Dr. Bumble been operating within the framework of care ethics rather than professional ethics, his behavior might have been different. Instead of reinforcing standardized rules, he might have been attuned to the relationship and to Angela's frustration with her inability to engage him in a responsive way. To be sure, Robert could have been acting out of the core of care ethics, and things might not have worked out with Angela. But the point is that these moments of acute therapist discomfort are not only clinical moments to be met with an analysis of countertransference and dealt with in supervision. They are also ethical moments where one human being attempts to engage another in dialogue. They are opportunities for receptivity and caring, for entering into caring and compassion.
It is exactly at moments like these that the ethical and the clinical meet. And it is at this level that the discourse of our field emphasizes only the clinical and not the ethical. Both are important, but as discussed following, if we never allow ourselves to meet one another in our particularity, the potential for abuse and perpetuation of power remain.
To summarize, the thinking of most current modern ethical codes is based on moral autonomy, formal relationships, and rules imposed by society. As we move closer to the actual players in a relationship, we can begin to see that much is left out of the scenario, and we can begin to question our assumptions. Care ethics brings us to dialogue, caring, and contingency rather than autonomy and objectivity. The attitude of care makes the boundaries between self and other more fluid. For through this attitude, the good of the other becomes part of the self's own good and the ends of the other, although not becoming the self's ends, nonetheless become alive to the self in a new way and take on new value because they are the ends of the other.
Care ethics provides an important counterpoint to liberal moral theory, where the particular dialogues with universal thought, formal relationships become more personal, and caring supplements mere rule following. It begins to question the idea of the autonomous self and speaks about selves-in-relation. But we can go further than this. There is another strand of modern ethical theory that emphasizes not only the importance of the immediate and caring relationships, but also begins to deeply question the nature of the autonomous self and its roots in responsibility to the other.
CLOSER YET: THE ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY, FACE, AND VOICE
For Levinas, love means entering into a relation with a mystery and acceding to its insolvability. "Love does not mean, nor does it lead to, 'grasping,' 'possessing,' 'getting to know,' let alone getting mastery over the object of love or getting it under control … Love means consent to a mystery of the other." (Levinas, quoted in Bauman, 2001, p. 168) A survey of modern ethical thought would not be complete without the inclusion of Immanuel Levinas. Levinas' philosophy is directly related to his experiences during World War II. His family died in the Holocaust, and, as a French citizen and soldier, Levinas himself became a prisoner of war in Germany. His life remained haunted by the fear and memory of the Nazi horror (Benso, 2000) . Along with many of the Continental philosophers of the late 20th century, Levinas questioned how such an atrocity could happen, given all the thought about ethics throughout the history of Western philosophy. Levinas argued against the Western philosophic tradition, and against Heidegger in particular, that ontology is not fundamental. Rather, for Levinas, ethics is a relation to and for an other, and as such is prior to being as the ground of human existence. Furthermore, ethics and the ethical imperative are prior to knowing. Before we "are," we are already in a relation to others. Levinas therefore argued that it is a mistake to begin by theorizing about the being of the self, inde-pendent of its relations of vulnerability and responsiveness to others, because the self is never independent of, or prior to, these ethical terms.
Ethics is the fundamental human experience, and is grounded in relations to others. Mainstream ethical philosophy, however, has inherited the notion of the self assumed by traditional metaphysics, and thus has been concerned with a subject it presumes to be autonomous and free, independent of others and faced with abstract questions about its own rights, duties, and freedoms. (Merleau, 2004, p. 1) Levinas' ethics and indeed all of his later philosophy are situated in an "encounter" with the other. For Levinas (1969) , ethics is a calling into question of the "Same":
A calling into question of the Same-which cannot occur within the egoistic spontaneity of the Same-is brought about by the Other. We name this calling into In Levinas' view, the basic philosophical motivation of the West is to gain total knowledge. This can be done only by searching for the sense of other beings, by knowing them through concepts, in their generality as a generalized other (see Mensch, 2001 ), therefore missing their individuality. The benefits of this "totalizing" are immense: "the self remains within itself, maintains its identity as limited by nothing, that is, free" (Benso, 2000, p. 7) . In other words, in a real encounter with the other, the self might not remain the same.
Levinas, then, attempted to undermine Western philosophy and its insensitivity to the other. He characterized most of philosophy as "egology" and preferred, instead of the "love of wisdom," the "wisdom of love" (Benso, 2000, p. 27) . To be ethical, one must be willing to enter the "space of love-the space of ambivalence(s), space of otherness(es)" (p. 28). In other words, for there to be an ethical relation with you, I cannot put you into my system, my consciousness of you. I must first of all accept that you call me into question. You do this because you are vulnerable and so ask me not to kill you, actually or metaphorically (which would be to reduce you to a role as a supporting character in my narrative). For ethical discourse to happen, I cannot put us into the same story, one that "I" tell, as if looking at us from the outside. I can only say to you "here I am" at your service because you are indeed Other, not merely an other (like me). Another way of saying this is to say that ethical language never speaks "about" an Other, but only "to" an Other (Robbins, 2001) .
Another important concept for Levinas is "Saying" versus "Said." In the to and fro of conversation, he wrote, closure is not attained. The ambiguity of language fails to satisfy the desires of speaker and listener for stable agreed meaning and mutual recognition. "The content of speech-the Said (Dit)-strives for universality and solidity. Yet, in the failure of that striving, the Saying (Dire) is revealedconversations continue and are not discreet exchanges of information" (Edgoose, 1997) . In schools, as in all other institutions, attention is paid only to the universality of the Said. We revere theories, books, and written and thought-out ideas more than the immediacy and uncertainty of the "saying"-ephemeral communication.
It is in Saying that we are vulnerable to the unknowable Other, and our dependence on, and responsibility for, the other is exposed.
Gibbs (2000) elaborated on this vulnerability:
To say, therefore, is not to utter words to the person near me. The context is a relation with another person, a neighbor. I bring before the other not some information or chosen meanings but the very vulnerability of myself. (p. 48) This saying can bring into question even the idea of the autonomous and invulnerable Western self. The metaphor that Gibbs used is that of a bank. If I exist as subject, he said, "I would, like a bank, have many thoughts and meanings in me, ready to be translated outside myself … Hence I could play the game of talking, but I need never risk myself" (p. 49). In the framework of Levinas, this is the essence of being unethical. 2 Levinas would insist that Dr. Bumble, when he diagnosed Angela earlier, had totalized her and had seen her only as a possessive "borderline" and not as a unique person. He would insist that Dr. Bumble could not act ethically if he acts on this totalization, reducing Angela to the "same"-that is, someone merely occupying Dr. Bumble's concepts. Ethics here is immediate and beyond articulation. According to Levinas, Angela's face makes the demand, "Do not kill me," and in his response to this, Robert Bumble's very self is constituted (Dueck, 2003) .
How would a Levinasian framing of the vignette look?
Robert Bumble, Ph.D., was treating a troubled young woman named Angela in his office at his home. The relationship between Dr. Bumble and Angela had been uneasy. During one particular session, Angela started asking questions about his personal life that Dr. Bumble found intrusive. He was somewhat uncomfortable and angry, and it had been a long day in a busy practice. He was tired of dealing with Angela. Yet he recognized the total responsibility that he owed her. He knew that he must not "totalize" her, or make her part of his story, as though she were a "type" or class of patient; he must not make their living "saying" into a concrete "said."
Among other questions, Angela asks, "Are you married?" Robert acknowledges that he does not know where this question comes from, but he recognizes the plea, "Do not kill me" (in other words, "Allow me to be"). Instead of remaining in his safe autonomy, he knows he must risk, open himself to her as he expects her to open to him. He knows he is called into question by her plea. He recognizes his reluctance to engage with her and his desire to withdraw behind professional boundaries and the fear that the question and the situation evoke in him. He also realizes that his response must be immediate, honest and authentic, and so he answers, "Yes, I am, and this is uncomfortable for me to talk about."
Angela is frightened by his reply. How is it that Dr. Bumble has feelings like she does? How is it that he is uncomfortable? Angela's self that is constituted in her responsibility to Robert is mobilized, and she is not sure what to do or say. She wants to totalize him, make him one of the many rejecting figures in her life, but somehow his vulnerability stops her. Nevertheless, she does respond with anger and feels betrayed by him. He acknowledges her feelings of loss and tries to understand them. As he does so, he finds he understands Angela at a much deeper level than her "pathology" and feels that in doing so, his universe is expanded. Although she is at first frightened, Angela also finds that she can expand how she thinks of Robert-not just as a therapist, but as a person.
It is here that the ethical "rubber hits the road." Not in broad categories of generalized others, but in the moment-to-moment encounter of concrete individuals with individual histories and needs. There is not an abandonment of clinical principles in this encounter, but the clinical remains in service to the ethical, remaining open to the mystery and the vulnerability of the other. Robert might have responded in a different way based on what he knew about the concrete Angela, but the important thing is that his response would not be based on her diagnosis, but on her.
How are we to work without totalizing and stereotyping the other? How do we work beyond the limited realm of concepts and predictability? It almost seems as though ethics at this level requires a different way of thinking, a different way of listening, and a different way of seeing.
LISTENING AND SEEING AS ETHICAL ACTS: EPISTEMOLOGY AND SELFHOOD
One of our most difficult duties as human beings is to listen to the voices of those who suffer … These voices bespeak conditions of embodiment that most of us would rather forget our vulnerability to. Listening is hard, but it is also a fundamental moral act; to realize the best potential in post-modern times requires an ethics of listening. (Frank, 1995, p. 25) Although the idea of listening is a very important one in psychotherapy, it has not been described in ethical terms, as I believe it must. Ethical listening places far greater demands on us than simply to understand or make sense of another person. In fact, in the terms stated previously, this is mere totalization-taking the other into our conceptual system rather than allowing our ideas, our epistemology, and even our very selves to be brought into question. As I have stated elsewhere,
The challenge here is in allowing ourselves as listeners to get outside of our own expectations and theoretical frame. If we are not sufficiently open to listen in ways that challenge our own thinking, nothing is left us but the boredom of remaining in the same abstract frame-a state that Fiumara (1990) calls benumbment, or "epistemic torpor." (as cited in Birrell & Freyd, in press) If Angela is thought of not as a "troubled young woman" or as a generalized member of a diagnostic category, but as a unique person with deep needs and desires that need to be heard and whose behavior has meaning-and if we are willing to have ourselves and our ways of believing questioned-we can begin to see her in a different way. The attention of listening can become a "drawing near to another person, which signifies welcoming the other person" (Gibbs, 2000, p. 47) . I am mixing my metaphors, but listening and seeing are deeply related. Listening and seeing, depending on how they are done, can give us a very different vision of others. Mensch (2003) referred to Pascal's concept of "subtle intelligence" (as opposed to "geometrical intelligence"; p. 139), which involves a subtle grasp of details and particulars. This subtle intelligence requires what Pascal called "good sight," by which we can see at one glance and not by process of reasoning. The opposite of good sight is stereotyping:
In its refusal to look beyond what fits a pre-given set of concepts, it limits what we can see. It thus makes invisible the context that could call these concepts into question-i.e., the context in terms of which they might be deemed inappropriate. (Mensch, 2003, p. 140) Nussbaum (1990) , in her discussion of Henry James novels, described the tendency of moral attention to present us with what is new to us, variously referring to it as perception and imagination. One sees, and the moral landscape is only well seen when, like a well-seen physical landscape, it is full of surprises. Nussbaum stated, Moral knowledge, James suggests, is not simply intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not even simply intellectual grasp of particular facts; it is perception. It is seeing a complex, concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with imagination and feeling. (p. 152) Murdoch (1971) called this good sight simply "attention." By this she meant "a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality" (p. 34). Murdoch emphasized that this concept of attention is moral vision. She claimed that moral goodness is connected with knowledge, but not with impersonal quasi-scientific knowledge of the ordinary world, whatever that may be, but with a refined and honest perception of what really is the case, a patient and just discernment and exploration of what confronts one, which is the result not simply of opening one's eyes but of a certainly perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline. (p. 37) It is the effort to counteract the convincingly coherent but false pictures of the world that we so naturally form and act from, without such moral attention. Talbot (2000) took this idea further and called it "seeing together," which takes the central concepts of attention but transforms them by putting them in the context of relation and partiality.
Selves who attend are relational selves, or selves-in-relation. Crucially, attention goes on in relation; it is something we do as selves-in-relation. What is revealed by me attending to you is revealed to us, not to me and to you individually. (p. 106) In other words, to truly have good sight, attend, or see together, we let go of the autonomous self that tries to grasp and control and become selves-in-relation, selves who care, selves to whom things matter.
Every ethical act has clinical implications, such as terminating therapy, referral, reporting child abuse. We can now see that every clinical act has ethical implications, informing not only our ethical life as a whole, but also our epistemology, our relationships, and even our concept of ourselves. Mainstream ethics has emphasized the autonomous self and a system of ethical codes, an approach that has remained largely unquestioned. This mainstream ethics is largely an ethic of the "Said," emphasizing universality, control, and reason. At the level of truly attending to one another, this ethics can become suffocating because it supports the idea of formal relationships only and does not allow for the face of the other, in Levinasian language, or seeing together.
THE ETHICS OF BEING ALIVE WITH OTHERS
Thus ethics is no longer a simple moralism of rules which decree what is virtuous. It is the original awakening of an I responsible for the other; the accession of my person to the uniqueness of the I called and elected to responsibility for the other. The human I is not a unit closed upon itself, like the uniqueness of the atom. But rather an opening, that of responsibility, which is the true beginning of the human and of spirituality. In the call which the face of the other man addresses to me, I grasp in an immediate fashion the graces of love: spirituality, the lived experience of authentic humanity. (Levinas, quoted in Robbins, 2001, p. 182) This quote from Levinas brings us full circle. Ethics can become a "moralism of rules which decree what is virtuous" (Levinas, quoted in Robbins, 2001, p. 182) , and this is the definition that is usually meant in discussions of ethics in our field. We have see that this definition is one that is based on a certain viewpoint-that of liberal moral theory-that is rooted in abstract principles, the autonomous self, and emotionless formal relationships. As Arthur Kleinman (1998) said, Ethical discourse is reflective and intellectualist, emphasizing cognition (more precisely, in today's jargon, rational choice) over affect or behavior and coherence over the sense of incompleteness and unknowability and uncontrollability that is so prevalent in ordinary life. Or at least this is its canonical form in the Western tradition. In the Western tradition it often includes strong emphasis on individual rights, what has been called "autonomy unbounded," and a search for a contextual objectivity: a view from nowhere. (p. 363) It is clear, however, that much of what we do is not abstract, but personal and emotional. Much is uncontrollable and unknowable. And if we are to reach for the "lived experience of authentic humanity," we must not stop at an ethic that is only defined by these abstract codes. Our striving for the good must happen in each and every moment of our work as clinicians and in our lives. Thinking about ethics at this level also threatens the idea of the autonomous self. As Gibbs (2000) said, My position as responder, as listening and so able to answer, defined what I am to be, defines the beginning of ethics. The self is not constituted through self-reflection, not through the accumulation of sensible experience and rational abstraction. The self is first of all in relation with other people … [T]he self who welcomes and attends, the listener, is the "real self. " (p. 32) This is a theme expanded on and elaborated on by relational/cultural theorists (Jordan, Walker, & Hartling, 2004; Walker & Rosen, 2004) . As Jordan (2004) stated,
The illusion of separation and the mistaken belief in autonomy contribute to the denial of the basic human need to participate in the growth of others and to being open to being moved by others. And yet the power to move others, to find responsiveness, to effect change, to create movement together is a vital part of good connection. (p. 5) And that connection is what makes us most truly human.
Twentieth-century approaches to ethics go far beyond liberal moral theory, expanding our ideas of ethics as merely following a set of principles, as universal as they might seem. Modern approaches include real and nitty-gritty situations, relationships that are between two real people rather than formal relationships, adding complexity to the encounter between two people, questioning dearly held ideas of certainty and knowing. Instead, these ways of thinking about ethics lead us to uncertainty in our epistemology, in our relationships, and in our concept of what it means to be a self. They lead us from the realm of justice and rights to that of love and compassion.
I once had the pleasure of working with a woman I call Cissy, whom one of my colleagues described as "remarkably psychotic." She thought she was a unicorn, and she and I spent week after week talking about unicorns. It became clear that for Cissy, the unicorn represented that part of herself that had to flee the world in the wake of an abusive father and a psychotic mother. Although Cissy was maintained with neuroleptic drugs, it was very difficult to call her back to an outside world that had been nothing but painful. In psychology's traditional discourse, the case of Cissy is well understood. She had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and was being given the standard treatment of drugs and supportive psychotherapy. There is no ethical dilemma because no ethical standards are being breached. I would argue however, that if that is all there is to therapy, then ethical standards are being breached. The ethics of the immediacy of the face-to-face encounter raise questions like these: What is going on in each moment, and how do I remain open to the face of the other, no matter how different and perhaps terrifying? How do I listen so as to allow Cissy to come into the world without taking her into my conceptual frame? If we allow our ethics to be a living thing rather than a codified one, if we dare to let every moment be alive with care and compassion, if we refuse to totalize others and try to trap them in our concepts and stereotypes, perhaps we can confer on them the possibility of being:
